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DOES IMPORTANCE EQUAL GREATNESS? 
REFLECTIONS ON JOHN MARSHALL AND 
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND1 
Sanford Levinson* 
David S. Schwartz’s The Spirit of the Constitution: John 
Marshall and the 200-Year Odyssey of McCulloch v. Maryland, 
is a truly excellent book, for which I was happy to contribute the 
following blurb appearing on the back jacket: 
“David Schwartz has written an indispensable study of the 
single most important Supreme Court case in the canon.  As 
such, he delineates not only the meaning and importance of 
the case in 1819, but also the use made of it over the next 
two centuries as it became a central myth and symbol of the 
very meaning of American constitutionalism.” 
I meant every word of it.  It is indispensable, which means 
that it not only deserves to be read, but really must be read, by 
anyone wishing to be truly literate in the subject of American con-
stitutional law and its development over time.  Jack Balkin and I 
published an essay in the Harvard Law Review some two decades 
ago2 about the various “canons in constitutional law,” where we 
distinguished among what we called the “pedagogical,” “cultural 
literacy,” and “contemporary constitutional theory” canons.  That 
is, cases that legal academics choose to teach as part of introduc-
tory courses—or place in casebooks designed to initiate students 
into the study of constitutional law—may or may not register in 
the memories of professional lawyers, let alone even well-edu-
cated laity.  They are irrelevant to the actual practice of law and 
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
1. This is a slightly revised version of my contribution to a symposium on David
Schwartz’s book initially posted on Balkinization.  Sandy Levinson, Does Importance Equal 
Greatness? Reflections on John Marshall and McCulloch v. Maryland, BALKINIZATION 
(Nov. 15, 2019), [https://perma.cc/2JUY-2J5S]. 
2. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 963 (1998). 
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rarely, if ever, come up in general conversation so that it might 
prove embarrassing not to be aware of a case.  And, separately, 
there are cases that are indeed well known that rarely, if ever, ap-
pear as the central focus of sophisticated treatments of constitu-
tional theory, just as the cases that do appear in such articles may 
be, as a practical matter, both untaught in introductory courses 
and sufficiently esoteric that even a fully competent lawyer would 
be forgiven ignorance of the case in question.   
Consider the chestnut case of Marbury v. Madison,3 surely 
part of the cultural literacy canon but otherwise, I believe, justifi-
ably ignored.  I have achieved a certain notoriety by refusing to 
teach Marbury, which I consider basically a waste of students’ 
valuable time in comparison with other cases—my stock example 
is Prigg v. Pennsylvania4—that I think are far more important for 
students to grapple with.  No one cares about the actual legal issue 
raised in Marbury—whether Congress can add to the original ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court; it is not relevant to any contem-
porary litigation, nor, as a matter of fact, does Marbury truly fea-
ture as the centerpiece of contemporary articles on constitutional 
theory, including, for that matter, the propriety of judicial review.  
No one who believes in modern judicial review is truly convinced 
by Marshall’s arguments, and those persuaded by his rhetoric can 
find themselves quite critical of the contemporary Court.  Given 
that Marbury is part of the cultural literacy canon, I usually did 
take literally five minutes to mention it to students before moving 
on to something I consider far more important for their education.  
What is distinctive about McCulloch v. Maryland is that a 
full two centuries after its decision, it remains a part of all three 
canons.  It is the only case, for example, that is printed unedited 
in the casebook that Jack and I co-edit, along with Akhil Amar 
and Reva Siegel,5 and I have conducted courses at both Harvard 
and the University of Texas in which the case was read aloud—
3. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).  My own take on Prigg can be
found at Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time?  Why Prigg is Worse than Dred 
Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. FORUM. 23 (2011). 
5. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 39 (7th ed.
2018).  Brest created the casebook singlehandedly in 1975; he no longer plays an active role 
in the editorial process. 
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and discussed—in its entirety over a twelve to fifteen-hour period 
of classes.  Perhaps that may be thought excessive, but I certainly 
know of no teacher of an introductory course—or editor of a case-
book—who ignores the case.  Eight years ago, when visiting the 
Yale Law School and teaching an introductory constitutional law 
course, I spent my usual several weeks on McCulloch and ex-
plained to undoubtedly restive students that I fully expected it to 
be intensely discussed in the Supreme Court’s much anticipated 
decision in the Obamacare case that came down in 2012.  I was 
relieved, but not surprised, when my expectations were fully met.6  
The discussion of the meaning of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause was as angry and disputatious in 2012 as it was in 1819, 
when James Madison, who had, after all, signed the Bill estab-
lishing the Second Bank of the United States, wrote Spencer 
Roane of Virginia that the Constitution never would have been 
ratified in 1787-88 had delegates to the various conventions real-
ized that the Clause would take on the meaning assigned to it by 
Chief Justice Marshall.7  “Necessary,” as we all know, turned out 
to mean “convenient” or “useful,” with attendant liberation, as it 
were, of congressional lawmakers, a proposition that can still en-
gender heated argument today.   
To be sure, and this is an important theme of Schwartz’s 
book, that is not the only message one can take from the opinion.  
As is true of most of the canonical opinions, one can find mixed 
messages and, therefore, develop conflicting doctrines that osten-
sibly follow from the valorized opinions.  For reasons that I liter-
ally do not understand, Marshall chose to begin his opinion by 
referring to Maryland as a “sovereign state,” which it most clearly 
is not, but there can be little doubt that by doing this he ended up 
giving aid and comfort to an anti-nationalist form of federalism 
that he was adamantly opposed to.  Indeed, my immediately prior 
contribution to the Arkansas Law Review elaborated my perplex-
ity about the very first sentence of Marshall’s opinion.8  Similarly, 
he writes fairly early on that “[t]his government is acknowledged 
by all to be one of enumerated powers,” which provides for many 
6. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2011).
7. See BREST ET AL., supra note 5, at 55.
8. Sanford Levinson, The Confusing Language of McCulloch v. Maryland:  Did Mar-
shall Really Know What He Was Doing (or Meant)?, 72 ARK. L. REV 7, 21 (2019). 
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the basis of the proposition that the national government pos-
sesses only these “enumerated powers” rather than “at least” what 
is written down.  As it happens, Schwartz, University of Michigan 
Professor of Law Richard Primus, and Georgetown Professor of 
Law John Mikhail are currently writing full-scale scholarly at-
tacks on this common belief, noting that Marshall never stated 
that the enumerated powers provided an exclusive and exhaustive 
account of what powers are available to the national government, 
even as gilded by his capacious interpretation of the “necessary 
and proper” clause.  Mikhail, for example, places great reliance 
on the Preamble as providing a source of power.   
In Paragraph 38 of the opinion—”Let the end be legitimate, 
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which 
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional”—is often interpreted basically to li-
cense Congress to do whatever it wishes.  Yet  Paragraph 42, ob-
viously only a few lines later, promises that the Court will monitor 
overreaching by a Congress that uses reference to assigned pow-
ers as only a “pretext” for what is not properly within that ambit.  
“[S]hould congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, 
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the 
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, 
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say, that 
such an act was not the law of the land.”  Not surprisingly, almost 
every lawyer educated since 1942 knows Paragraph 38 because it 
has been cited so often to justify what came to be called “the New 
Deal Settlement” and to stave off accusations that Supreme Court 
opinions upholding wide-reaching congressional legislation were 
“revolutionary” (at least in constitutional terms).  It is worth not-
ing that Bruce Ackerman’s important rendering of the New Deal 
as a “constitutional moment” amending the Constitution outside 
Article V in effect requires ignoring, or at least diminishing the 
relevance, of McCulloch. 
Yet, as Schwartz notes, every lawyer educated in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would have been at least 
as familiar, if not more so, with Paragraph 42 inasmuch as it was 
repeatedly cited in what were often 5-4 decisions striking down 
federal legislation on the ground that Congress was in fact acting 
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ultra vires by asserting a national “police power” under the guise 
of regulating commerce.  This was, of course, basically correct, 
though the dominant response, including that of the Court, and 
especially after the New Deal, is “so what,” given the establish-
ment of some “nexus” with interstate commerce, however tenu-
ous.   
As Marshall himself writes, a constitution is “designed to 
endure” and not to emulate, say, what Hamilton termed the “im-
becilic” Articles of Confederation,9 which proved inefficacious; 
this necessarily means that the United States Constitution must be 
“adapted to the various crises of human affairs” rather than read 
as trapping us inside a collective iron cage that prohibits even the 
possibility of mastering these crises.  In any event, it should be 
clear beyond dispute that McCulloch is of almost unique im-
portance on its 200th anniversary even if, as Schwartz demon-
strates, it was in fact often ignored.  Therefore, any book delving 
as deeply into its history and later impact as Schwartz’s does will 
therefore be an important moment in legal scholarship.  
All of this being said, I confess that I do find myself, partly 
as the result of the stimulation of reading Schwartz’s book, more 
and more wondering whether McCulloch’s truly undeniable “im-
portance” translates into it being as well a “great opinion” that 
establishes Marshall as a uniquely “great judge.”  Why, after all, 
is he often referred to as the “Great Chief Justice”?  Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes gave a famously snarky address on “John Marshall 
Day” in 1901, celebrating the 100th anniversary of his appoint-
ment as one of John Adams’s “midnight judges” to the federal 
judiciary as a presumed guardian against the Jeffersonian menace 
about to take power.  What Holmes was willing to say was that, 
like other ostensibly great men, Marshall “represented a great 
ganglion in the nerves of society”; he had the great advantage of 
being present at “a strategic point in the campaign of history, and 
part of his greatness consists in his being there.”  This is obviously 
very different from saying, for example, that his greatness con-
sisted in his providing a role model for future judges or even that 
9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton); THE FEDERALIST NO. 20
(James Madison & Alexander Hamilton). 
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his opinions were necessarily persuasive, let alone convincing, on 
further reading.  
Marshall was a rhetorical genius, but this is inevitably a 
mixed compliment once one sees through some of the rhetoric, 
including the presuppositions that are smuggled into the opinions 
and are, by the very nature of presuppositions, assumed rather 
than argued for.  We know from one of the classic critiques of 
rhetoric, Plato’s Gorgias dialogue, that the acid test for the skilled 
rhetor is to make “the lesser appear the greater,” to persuade lis-
teners that what is “in fact” the weaker argument is better than its 
challenger.  To mention only undiscussed presuppositions, con-
sider, for example, his declaration that the United States was des-
tined to reach the Pacific Ocean and become a great empire in its 
own right, which necessitated (especially if one had a lax defini-
tion of “necessity”) congressional power to charter a bank (and, 
of course, much else).  If one did not share such imperial ambi-
tions, one might be satisfied to tend one’s garden, but that is never 
an offer, as it were.   
Moreover, Marshall might have upheld the Bank on any one 
of multiple arguments:  To name only three, in addition to the one 
he offered, he could have engaged in the equivalent of independ-
ent review and determined that there was indeed what we would 
today call a “compelling interest,” demonstrating the “necessity” 
under a rigorous definition of chartering the Bank.  Or, somewhat 
different would have been a review of the congressional debate 
regarding the Bank and the determination that, as with modern 
administrative agencies, Congress had indeed given a “hard look” 
at the arguments for and against a Bank and, using the correct 
standard of rigorous “necessity,” reasonably determined that the 
General Welfare really would be enhanced by establishing a Sec-
ond Bank after the lapse of the First Bank.  Or, as Eric Lomazoff 
has argued in his own recent book, Reconstructing the National 
Bank Controversy, he could have adopted the argument actually 
proffered by Madison and his allies, which is the propriety of the 
Bank under the Coinage Clause of Article I, something Marshall 
simply ignored in his desire to offer a far broader, Hamiltonian, 
reading of the Constitution.  One reason that McCulloch repays 
close reading is precisely that Marshall is such a clever rhetori-
cian.  Watching him perform is a bit like observing a master of 
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intellectual three-card monte.  One might think one is following 
the moves and, therefore, can locate the ace, but one is almost 
always wrong unless one can slow down the action and observe 
the various feints and deceptions.   
Is Schwartz’s book “definitive”?  The answer is no, and not 
simply for the same reason that one can no more write a truly 
“definitive” study of McCulloch than one can of King Lear, espe-
cially if one is interested not only in what Shakespeare might have 
been thinking, but also in the historical reception and productions 
of the play through the decades.  After all, for almost a century, 
apparently, Cordelia lived, because it was just too sad to accept 
her cruel and unjustified death.  Who knows what the future might 
bring with regard to directors “revisioning” the play?  Cordelia 
might still die, but perhaps Regan and Goneril will be re-imagined 
as protofeminists in justified revolt against an almost stereotypi-
cally patriarchal tyrant.  Richard Rorty once defined intellectual 
history as a process by which ostensible “interpreters” took cul-
turally authoritative texts and “beat them” into forms that would 
be useful for new arguments in new settings.  Whether or not that 
describes the history of philosophy, it is surely accurate regarding 
the use of legal arguments in the development of legal doctrines.  
Lawyers are rhetors, committed not to some Dworkinian notion 
of “the right answer” but, rather, to presenting whatever argu-
ments are thought to enhance the interests of one’s client.  Judges 
may not have clients in a standard sense, but, as Balkin and I have 
also argued,10 they do have distinct visions of what we call “high 
politics” as to what will best serve the interests of the United 
States—or perhaps the institutional interests of the Court itself, as 
in Marbury—and the arguments are crafted accordingly.   
But there is one other major reason beyond the inability to 
foretell the future that Schwartz’s book, however truly invaluable, 
nonetheless has its limits: like almost all modern treatments of 
McCulloch, it concentrates almost exclusively on what profes-
sionals have come to call McCulloch I, that is, the first 45 para-
graphs of the opinion that uphold congressional power to charter 
the Bank.  That is, to be sure, the part of the opinion that is of 
10. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revo-
lution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
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overwhelming importance, for good or for ill, in our world today.  
But McCulloch I is immediately followed by 30 paragraphs of 
McCulloch II, in which the lack of Maryland’s alleged “sover-
eignty,” however much it might be proclaimed in the very first 
sentence, is made clear inasmuch as the Court invalidates the 
state’s attempt to tax the Bank on the basis of what Marshall iden-
tifies as the “texture” of the Constitution rather than anything in 
the text or even demonstrable history that might support the in-
validation.  For example, he rather ruthlessly dismisses the rele-
vance of Federalist 32, in which Hamilton fully recognizes that 
the concurrent powers of both states and the national government 
to engage in taxation would almost inevitably create conflict; 
Hamilton appeared to suggest that such conflict would (and 
should) be resolved politically.  There was not an iota of a sug-
gestion that the conflict would be “legalized” and made the sub-
ject of cases to be settled by the federal judiciary.  Instead, Mar-
shall reached out to assert a significant new realm of judicial 
power.  McCulloch I can be cited as an example of extreme “ju-
dicial restraint,” whereas McCulloch II is just the opposite.   
Moreover, Marshall justifies his conclusion that Maryland is 
without the power to tax the Bank of the United States by rhetor-
ically presupposing that the Bank is unequivocally an instrument 
of the national government, akin, say, to an army base or the na-
tional Capitol.  Not once, though, does he ever deign to inform 
the reader that the Bank is what we would today describe as a 
joint venture between the U.S., which owned twenty percent of 
the stock, and private investors who owned the other eighty per-
cent.  When vetoing the renewal of the Bank’s charter in 1832, 
Andrew Jackson would make this a central point.  But Monroe’s 
Secretary of the Treasury years earlier had made it clear to the 
president of the Bank, in a private letter, that his first loyalties 
should be to the private shareholders.  Suffice it to say that there 
is little in that part of the opinion that should commend it to some-
one today looking for a model of “great” judging even if we put 
to one side the brute fact that no judges today write in what Karl 
Llewellyn identified as the “Grand Style,” substituting instead 
endless (and tedious) exercises in purported analysis of prece-
dents (as against Marshall’s willingness to ignore almost com-
pletely any existing precedents).  
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On more than one occasion, I asked my students, as part of 
final examinations, to specify what they considered the “best” 
opinion read during the semester and to offer reasons for their 
designation.  Perhaps because they picked up what was then my 
deep esteem for McCulloch, quite a few students selected Mar-
shall’s opinion.  I suspect I might have done so myself at some 
stage of my career. I did refer to it as a magnificent state paper, a 
“prose poem” setting out a vision of American political develop-
ment as well as of a Constitution conducive to that development.  
For better or worse, I would not do so now.  With all of its prob-
lems, I am now inclined to pick Robert Jackson’s concurring 
opinion, signed only by himself, in the Steel Seizure Case, not 
least because it conveys on almost every page a deep sense of a 
gifted lawyer and citizen truly grappling with the deep issues pre-
sented instead of purporting to announce a judgment from on 
high, in which the judge pretends simply to be the vessel through 
which the impersonal majesty of the law speaks.  But I hope I 
have also made it clear that this change in my own perception 
regarding the assessment of McCulloch in no way affects my 
judgment about its continuing unique importance for anyone stud-
ying American constitutional law and history or of the indispen-
sability of David Schwartz’s marvelous book. 
